objects of actions can also serve to set up important rela tions between actions. Consider the differences that might obtain in relation to questions of allocations of respons ibility among these three schemata.
(1) If p then q, and a brings it about that p.
(2) p obtains, and a brings it about that if p then q.
(3) a brings it about that p, and a brings it about that if p then q.
To exemplify case (2): Smith carefully places a bucket of water over a door in such a way that if anyone walks through the door, he will be drenched. Jones wanders through the doorway at random. Case (1): Schmidt has set up a bucket arrangement over the door, then Smith urges Jones (success fully) to walk through. Case (3): Smith not only sets up the bucket, but also brings it about that Jones walks through the doorway. In each case, Smith may be said to have brought it about that Jones is drenched. We may well be inclined to say that in each case, however, Smith's action is indirect. He did not drench Jones directly in the sense of throwing the water "through his own personal agency," but he set in motion a sequence of events that culminated in a drenching of Jones. It was a consequence of something Smith did that Jones was drenched. Thus conditional rela tions between propositions (the objects of actions) affect the question of whether propositions are correctly said to be made true by agents.
It is interesting to consider what kinds of conditionals might be appropriate in studying expressions like (1), (2) and (3). The first candidate to look at might be the material conditional, yielding these respective schemata. Each of these might be thought to serve as a possible definiens for a variety of indirect agency. But (lm) is 4 In one respect, the approach of Davidson [11] is closer to the one followed here than that of Danto, Goldman and Chisholm: Davidson proposes relations between events (ordin ary event causality) as agency-generators whereas Danto, Goldman, and Chisholm appear to focus on relations between actions in this connection. 154 Other axioms, rules, and a model-sets semantics are given by Porn in a way that is formally adequate. But many per plexing questions are forthcoming regarding the application to the theory of action of a notion of bringing-about of which (3n) is true.
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What we call here the phenomenon of indirect action has been dubbed "the accordion effect" by Feinberg in [12] . To use Davidson's famous example: a man moves his finger, thus flicking the switch, causing a light to come on, the room to be illuminated, and a prowler to be alerted. Once he has moved his finger, "each consequence presents us with a deed," [11, 16] . However, the accordion effect is only one kind of indirect action, having the form of a series of relations conforming to schema (1).
In Danto [9] , Goldman [13] , and Chisholm [6] , we find the conjecture that chains of actions of the accordion effect type commence at an origin or lower bound, the so-called basic action, the action not caused by any other in the chain (although the appropriate relation is not causal for Chisholm or Goldman). Davidson [11] , for whom the relation is causal, accepts a similar notion, called primitive action. Here, we will discuss indirect agency only from a relative point of view, and not take the step of asking whether an indirect action can be traced back through a relational sequence to some absolute origin, the basic action. Obviously however, the question of indirect agency has significant implications for the issue of basic action. §2 Tense and Overdetermination Problems It has been suggested in [25] that (3n) admits of two special kinds of problems as an account of bringing-about:
What Porn suggests is actually a truth-functional equiv aient of (3n), namely: ô (p d q) o (ô p ^ 6 q).
(i) problems of overdetermination, and (ii) tense problems similar to those described by Thomson [23] . One case may illustrate both kinds of problems. Suppose Smith shoots Jones at ti fatally in the sense that Jones must expire at t3 , shortly after ti. But shortly after ti and before t3 , Jones is at t2 struck fatally by lightning. To better fit the mould of (3), as opposed to (2) or (1), assume that Smith has treated the bullet with a slow-acting but deadly substance so that we may say that Smith has brought it about that if Jones is shot, Jones dies. The problem of overdetermination is that Smith apparently satisfies the antecedent of (3n), but not clearly the consequent, in the sense that he has brought it about that Jones died.* We might say: Smith ensured that Jones would die, but he was not the actual agent of the death. Second, the tensing problem may be exhibited as follows. Let pti represent 'Jones is shot at ti' and qt3 represent 'Jones is dead at t3'. Since the time of a bringing-about may be different from the time what is brought about actually obtains, we may reflect on the question of what might be the most appro priate time indices for the three 6's in (3n) as applied to our example. Let us take the three in order. First, presumably Smith's bringing it about that Jones is shot at ti occurred slightly before ti when, say, Smith pulled the trigger. Second, Smith brought it about that if Jones was shot he would die when Smith put the toxic substance on the bullet, say, at some time previous to pulling the trigger. Or did he? Perhaps he didn't actually bring about 'pti qt3 ' until the bullet came into contact with Jones. Temporal troubles already begin at this point, but let us pass on to the third 6: when did Smith bring it about that Jones is dead? Here a philosophically troublesome dilemma is posed. At any time previous to t3, Jones To make the transition from the remarks above to Ranger's theory, two observations are in order. First, our problems with applying (3m) to the language of agency may suggest reinterpreting ' < 5 ap' as it appears in (3m) to read 'a ensures that p' or 'a guarantees that p will obtain' where it is not implied that a actually brings it about that p; it is only required that a makes it "necessary'' in some sense that p obtains. This reading would be in keeping with the essentially modal character of (3m) as well as being suggested by both tense and overdetermination problems. Second, a remark of Bennett [3] suggests a modification of (3m) in the analysis of action sentences. Bennett (3, 319f.] remarks that the right way to parse a killing is not, say a shooting which later became a killing (no mention of shooting is implied simply by killing), but rather an action which later became a killing. The word an here suggests an existential quantification. In other words, on one view, kill a may be parsed bringing about something that leads to a 1s dying. This thought might prompt us to modify (3m) as follows. Far from attempting to develop a comprehensive appreci ation or evaluation of Ranger's extraordinarily interesting theory, we confine the discussion in the sequel to our special theme here, namely the relevance of expressions of the style of (3) to the theory of action. But first some general remarks.
Being kicked in the pants is necessary and sufficient for something Jones does, say shouting in surprise. There fore being kicked in the pants by Smith is something Jones does? Ranger might of course argue that if the kick is really sufficient, then Jones' shout is not an action, but a reflex or something of the sort. But perhaps in that case the shouting is really an action of Smith, since some thing he did is, by supposition, both necessary and suffi cient for it. Suppose Schmidt wires a bomb to the starter of Jones' car. Jones turns on the ignition, on his way to work in the morning, and dies as a result of the explosion. Here it is true that something Jones did (turning the key) was sufficient for his death (given the way the world was at that time). But it is not true that Jones committed suicide, or even brought about his own death, although he did in some way contribute to his own death, or to the process that culminated in his death. Even if Jones turning the key was a necessary condition of his becoming dead (if some one else tried to turn the key, they would not have succeeded because only Jones knew how to jiggle it in a certain way to make it work). It remains inappropriate to say that Jones brought about his own death or killed him self, even though Do-agency would be applicable to such a case.
Clearly many philosophical questions concerning the applicability of (KD) to the language of action remain, but let us return to considering expressions of the form of (3). Consider a scenario where removing the chains is a necessary condition of Jones' leaving the room-or to put it conversely-Jones having left the room is a sufficient condition of the chains having been removed. Suppose Smith removes the chains. Now it does not follow that Jones has F-4 159 removed the chains, even though 'Dojones The chains are removed' is appropriate. By supposition, the removal of the chains is an action of Smith's. Nor does it follow in any obvious sense that Jones has ensured that the chains are removed, since we might quite consistently suppose that it was not possible in the given circumstances for Jones to remove the chains. Nor was the removal of the chains a consequence of something Jones did, even though his leaving the room was a sufficient condition of the chains having been removed. Nor did Jones, in any plaus ible sense, indirectly bring it about or cause it to happen that the chains were removed. Thus it seems best to dismiss the possibility of these kinds of interpreta tions at the outset and concentrate on the literal reading of 'Doap ' and the like as 'something a does is sufficient for p' and so forth in considering expressions of the style of (3). So long as we waive any interpretation in terms of 'a brings it about that p' or 'a sees to it that p' or other idioms of agency of this kind, the following three principles seem secure from any of the objections canvassed above.
(K3Do) If something a does is sufficient for p and something a does is sufficient for 'p 3 q' , then something a does is sufficient for q.
(K3Do) If something a does is necessary for p and something a does is necessary for 'p 3 q', then something a does is necessary for q.
(K3Do) If something a does is both necessary and sufficient for p and something a does is both necessary and sufficient for 'p 3 q', then something a does is both necessary and suffi cient for q.
The third principle will be a logical consequence of the previous pair, at least in Kanger's system, for the follow ing schema is a theorem in that system: This is a speculative question, given the present devel opment of the theory of action, but perhaps here we can provide a partial framework in which to set the question, and some clues to answers in recent work of Chisholm 
Also we need to distinguish between interpersonal agency, 'a brings it about that q and q is a necessary (or suffi cient) condition of b's bringing it about that p'; indirect agency that is not necessarily interpersonal, 'a brings it about that q and q is necessary (or sufficient) for p'; and non-interpersonal agency, 'a brings it about that q and q is necessary (or sufficient) for p, where p is not a bringing-about of any state of affairs by any agent (except indirectly by a)'.
Unfortunately for theoretical economy however, even St. Anselm's distinction seems to be inescapably causal in structure, since some of our earlier problems reappear in it if the R-relation is necessary or sufficient condition ality minus tense or other causal stipulations. Because it is true that Smith's doing an autopsy on Jones is a sufficient condition of Jones not being alive, it hardly follows that Smith indirectly brought it about that Jones is not alive, at least in any sense of 'bringing-about' that is any obvious way relevant to the theory of action. (i) a brings about p, (ii) q obtains, (iii) a could reasonably have omitted p, (iv) by having omitted p, a could reasonably have avoided that q was realized, and (v) a's bringing it about that p is a sufficient condition of q. So outlined, a certain similarity to the theory of Pôrn or Ranger may seem appar ent, but Àqvist's account of the language of (i) -(v) is expressed through the notion of a game-tree, and is thus radically different from the Kanger-Pdrn approach that was set in possible worlds semantics. Aqvist's approach is highly innovative and, in the opinion of this author, should have a revolutionary effect on the development of subsequent action theory.8
In Porn [19], 'Dap' is now read, following Ranger as 'it is necessary for something which a does that p'. Porn now combines
Intuitively, a game-tree is an upwards-branching graph starting from one node called the initial situation and every node represents a concrete situation.
Aqvist thinks of the nodes as time-points and these may be ranked horizontally so that each set of points at a given level all occur "at the same time," and as we go up the tree, we go to succeeding times. This element of "times" is not essential to the notion of a "tree," however. A path can be traced out from each node to each other node, except that in a tree, as opposed to other kinds of connec ted graphs, nodes may not be joined horizontally to form Its' is necessary relative to a set of laws ç and a set of facts X tjc, then when am I said to bring it about that qt3? The upshot of [23] is that serious objections may be brought against any of the obvious answers, and that about the best one can settle for is to conclude somewhat lamely that I brought about qt3 in the interval tl-t3 . Perhaps the reason why no answer seems really satisfactory is that none is-rather, the time of bringing about q is relative to the time we pick at which % is alleged to obtain. This time might vary--see the reference in note 12,
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. This suggestion is due to Max Cresswell in discussion. 171 
